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BACKGROUND
The Philippines has a unitary form of government with a mul-
titiered structure.  It is a presidential republic with a bicameral leg-
islature (composed of the Senate with 24 members and the House of
Representatives with 240 members).
At the top is the central government operating through some
20 departments/agencies.  Administratively, the country is divided
into 15 administrative regions and most departments maintain re-
gional offices.  In addition, there is one autonomous region, the Au-
tonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).  It should be em-
phasized, however, that the regions (with the exception of the
ARMM) are just administrative subdivisions and not regional gov-
ernments with elected regional officials.
The second tier of government is composed of local govern-
ment units (LGUs).  The local government structure is composedPHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 34
1 These numbers change over time as new LGUs are created.  For instance, in 1991, there were
76 provinces, 66 cities, and 1,540 municipalities.
of three layers.  Provinces comprise the first layer.  A province is
divided into municipalities and component cities, each of which is
further subdivided into barangays, the smallest political unit.  At
the same time, highly urbanized and independent cities exist at
the same level as the provinces, i.e., they share the same functions
and authorities.  However, these cities are partitioned directly into
barangays.
In 2002, there are 80 provinces, 114 cities, 1,496 municipali-
ties, and some 42,000 barangays.1   Each level of LGU is headed by
an elected chief executive (governor, mayor, barangay captain)
and has a legislative body or Sanggunian (composed of an elected
vice-governor/vice-mayor and council members).  All elected offi-
cials have a three-year term of office.  To a large extent, each level
of local government is autonomous although higher level govern-
ments (e.g., province) exercise some degree of supervision over
lower level governments (e.g., municipalities and component cit-
ies) in terms of budgeting and legislation.
The passage in 1991 of the new Local Government Code (LGC
or Code) represents a major shift in local governance in the Philip-
pines.  It consolidated and amended the Local Government Code of
1983, the Local Tax Code (Presidential Decree 231), and the Real
Property Tax Code (Presidential Decree 464).  The Code includes
far-reaching provisions affecting the assignment of functions across
different levels of government, the revenue sharing between the
central and the local governments, the resource generation/utili-
zation authorities of LGUs, and the participation of civil society in
various aspects of local governance.  As a whole, it provides a
framework in support of increased local autonomy.
Devolution of Functions
The LGC mandates the devolution to LGUs of many func-
tions previously discharged by central government agencies.  PriorMANASAN : Devolution of ENR Management       35
to the implementation of the Code, the functions assigned to LGUs
were limited to the levy and collection of local taxes, the issuance
and enforcement of regulations governing the operation of busi-
ness activities in their jurisdictions, and the administration of cer-
tain services and facilities like garbage collection, public markets,
slaughterhouses and public cemeteries.  Then, LGUs played a sec-
ondary role in agricultural planning and extension, construction
and maintenance of local roads and public buildings, and opera-
tion of high schools and hospitals/health services, with the cen-
tral government carrying the primary responsibility for the deliv-
ery of said services.  In contrast, the Code transfers from national
government agencies to LGUs the principal responsibility for the
delivery of basic services and the operation of facilities in the fol-
lowing areas: agricultural extension and research, social forestry,
environmental management and pollution control, primary health
care, hospital care, social welfare services, water supply, commu-
nal irrigation, land use planning, and repair and maintenance of
local infrastructure facilities.  The devolution is substantial not only
in terms of the number of functions that were shifted but more so
in terms of the number of personnel transferred (Table 1) and the
corresponding reductions implied in the budgets of affected na-
tional government agencies (Table 2).  The national government
agencies that were most heavily affected by devolution were the
Department of Agriculture (DA), Department of Health (DoH),
and the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).
The devolution of expenditure responsibilities to LGUs, with
a few exceptions, is consistent with the decentralization theorem
which states that “public service is provided most efficiently by the
jurisdiction having control over the minimum geographical area that
would internalize benefits and costs of such provision”.2   For the
2 There is one important exception to the application of the decentralization theorem. Educa-
tion is primarily provided by the central government although construction and mainte-
nance of school buildings are devolved to LGUs.  Thus, teacher salaries and major education
inputs are the responsibility of the central government although many LGUs do top up cen-
tral government allocations for these items.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 36
Table 1. Number of devolved personnel, 1992
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Source: 1993 National Expenditure Program, Regional Coordination Staff.
Table 2. Agency budgets and devolution, 19921  (in thousand pesos)
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1 Based on the 1992 Expenditure Program and incorporates full-year impact of the functions/projects/activi-
ties devolved. Captures only expenditures of devolving agencies (i.e., Office of the Secretary of Departments
except for the Department of Agriculture which also includes the National Meat Inspection Commission).
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most part, devolved functions are activities that can be provided
at low levels of governments.  The activities identified have few
important spillovers to a broader community to indicate that they
should be provided by higher levels of government.  The function-
ing of the decentralization theorem is enhanced by the provision in
the Code that permits LGUs to regroup into larger cooperative units
when important spillovers occur. Thus, smaller LGUs may form
associations that may enable them to carry out their responsibilities
jointly when there are economies in doing so and when inter-LGU
spillovers are present.  Examples exist of contiguous LGUs combin-
ing resources to deal, for instance, with solid waste disposal, coastal
and local fishing problems.
Expenditure assignments are generally clear and well under-
stood by LGUs.  The Code actually provides an explicit and clear
delineation of functions across levels of governments, except per-
haps in the area of ENR management and public works.3  However,
a continuing source of irritation between the central government
and LGUs is the propensity of some central government agencies to
exercise undue influence on LGUs on how they should conduct their
expenditure responsibilities.  For instance, the Department of Inte-
rior and Local Government  (DILG) have issued a number of
circulars that impose restrictions on the way LGUs can spend their
local development fund.4
Tax Assignment
In the Philippines, various types of taxes are assigned exclu-
sively, to a large extent, to different levels of governments.  The
3 For instance, the Code gives municipalities the responsibility over community-based for-
estry and watershed projects but allows the Department of Environment and Natural Re-
sources (DENR) to retain supervision and control over such projects.  Similarly, LGUs are
tasked with the primary responsibility for the construction and maintenance of local roads
but the DPWH may continue to undertake similar activities if the funding comes from na-
tional funds.  The problems related to the ambiguities in the devolution of functions in ENR
management to LGUs will be discussed in greater detail in the succeeding section.
4 Under the Code, LGUs are mandated to allocate 20 percent of their internal revenue
allotment or IRA (otherwise known as the local development fund) for development
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income tax (both individual and corporate), the value added tax,
customs duties, and excise taxes on alcoholic beverages, tobacco
products and petroleum products are reserved for the central gov-
ernment alone.  The real property tax and the community tax (poll
tax), however, may only be imposed by LGUs.
Outside of real property tax revenues, the major portion of
local government tax receipts is derived from the local business tax
(basically a turnover tax that is levied on the gross receipts of busi-
nesses/traders) although there is a plethora of other taxes that LGUs
are authorized to levy.  The base of each of these taxes is defined by
central government legislation, which also limits (i.e., sets floors and/
or ceilings) the tax rates LGUs may impose.
Note that only cities and municipalities (but not provinces)
are authorized to levy the local business tax and the community
tax.  However, in addition to the real property tax, provinces are
allowed to levy a tax on the following: transfer of ownership of
real property, franchises, business of printing or publication, sand
and gravel extraction, professionals, amusement places, and de-
livery vans.  But, in practice, the size of the base of provincial taxes
outside of the real property tax is not significant.
The Code also expanded the tax base of LGUs to include
products, activities and sectors (like banks and other financial in-
stitutions, and printing/publication) that used to be outside the
reach of local taxation.  It also increased the maximum allowable
rates at which most local taxes may be levied.  However, the Code
effectively reduced the assessment levels (for purposes of real prop-
erty taxation) of residential land, all types of buildings and all types
of machinery.
On the whole, however, the bulk of the productive tax bases
rest with the central government.  Also, many LGUs have not fully
utilized their revenue-raising powers even as the IRA distribution
formula has been shown to have a disincentive effect on local tax
effort.  Thus, over the years, the contribution of LGUs to total tax
revenues of the general government (central government and LGUsMANASAN : Devolution of ENR Management       39
combined) has remained low—only 6 percent in 1992-2001 com-
pared with 4 percent prior to the LGC.
Intergovernmental Transfers
In the Philippine system of intergovernmental relations,
LGUs share in the proceeds of national tax revenues through the
internal revenue allotment (IRA).  The IRA represents a fixed share
of central government internal revenue tax collections.  It is trans-
ferred as a block grant from the central government to LGUs and as
such LGUs exercise full discretion as to its utilization.  The IRA is
allocated to the different levels of local government and to specific
LGUs within each level according to a pre-determined formula that
is based on population, land area and equal sharing.
The Code prescribes a higher LGU share in internal revenue
taxes collected by the central government.  Under the Code, the ag-
gregate IRA of LGUs is set at 40 percent of internal revenue tax col-
lections three years prior to the current year.  In comparison, under
the pre-Code regime, the share of LGUs in national taxes was equal
to 20 percent of internal revenue taxes at the maximum.5
Under the Code, the IRA is divided among the different levels
of local government—23 percent to provinces, 23 percent to cities,
34 percent to municipalities, and 20 percent to barangays.  Prior to
the Code, the inter-tier allocation of the IRA was 27 percent to prov-
inces, 22 percent to cities, 41 percent to municipalities, and 10 per-
cent to barangays.
The IRA share of each tier of local government is then appor-
tioned to individual LGUs on the basis of population (50 percent),
land area (25 percent), and equal sharing (25 percent).  In the pre-
Code period, the intra-tier allocation to individual LGUs was deter-
mined as follows: 70 percent on the basis of population, 20 percent
land area, and 10 percent equal sharing.
5 The amount of IRA that was actually appropriated during the pre-Code era was very often
less than 20 percent of internal revenue taxes.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 40
In addition to the IRA, the Code mandates that LGUs re-
ceive a 40 percent share in the proceeds from the utilization and
development of national wealth (i.e., natural resources) within their
jurisdiction.  There was no equivalent provision in the earlier legis-
lation.
Fiscal Autonomy
The Code likewise allows LGUs greater autonomy not only in
mobilizing resources from local sources but also in allocating such
resources to their various needs.  First, it markedly liberalized the
scope for LGU credit financing.  The Code no longer requires cen-
tral government approval prior to the issuance of LGU debt even as
it allows greater flexibility as to the source and type of credit.  Sec-
ond, the Code also repealed some of the statutory requirements that
limited the latitude of LGUs in allocating their budgets.  For instance,
the mandatory contributions to the Philippine National Police (which
used to be set at 18 percent of LGUs’ regular income in the general
fund) and to hospitals operated by the DoH (which used to be equal
to 3-5 percent of their regular income) were abolished.6
Popular Participation
Lastly, the Code provides that LGUs shall promote the estab-
lishment and operation of people’s and nongovernmental organi-
zations (POs and NGOs) to become active partners in the pursuit of
local autonomy.  In particular, the Code mandates the participation
of POs and NGOs in local special bodies like the local development
council, local school board, local health board, and local pre-qualifi-
cation, bids and awards committee.
6 However, the Code increased other mandatory expenditures like the statutory reserves for
calamities.  Also, it increased the number of mandatory positions in the local bureaucracy.MANASAN : Devolution of ENR Management       41
CONSTRAINTS IN THE DEVOLUTION OF ENR
MANAGEMENT
Unclear Delineation of Expenditure Assignment
At first blush, the Code is quite categorical in devolving func-
tions related to ENR management to LGUs.  For instance, Section 3
(Operative Principles of Decentralization) of the Code provides that
“LGUs  shall share with the National Government the responsibil-
ity in the management and maintenance of ecological balance within
their territorial jurisdiction, subject to the provisions of the Code
and national policy.”  In more specific terms, Section 17 assigns the
following functions and responsibilities, among others, to LGUs:
• To cities and municipalities – extension and on-site research
services and facilities related to agriculture and fishery ac-
tivities which include ….  interbarangay irrigation system
systems, water and soil resource utilization and conserva-
tion projects; enforcement of fishery laws in municipal
waters including the conservation of mangroves; subject to
national policies and subject to supervision, control and review
of the DENR, implementation of community-based forestry
projects which include integrated social forestry programs
and similar projects; management and control of commu-
nal forests with an area not exceeding 50 square kilome-
ters; 7  establishment of  tree parks, greenbelts, and similar
forest development projects); 8  solid waste disposal system
or environmental management system, and services or fa-
cilities related to general hygiene and sanitation;
• To cities and provinces – pursuant to national policies and
subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR, en-
forcement of forestry laws limited to community-based
7 Including the management, protection, rehabilitation and maintenance of small watershed
areas that are sources of local water supply as identified by the DENR.
8 Except those covered by the Integrated Areas Protection System.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 42
forestry projects, pollution control law, small-scale min-
ing law, and other laws on the protection of the environ-
ment; and mini-hydroelectric projects for local purposes
(italics supplied).
In addition, the Code mandated local chief executives (mu-
nicipal/city mayors and provincial governors) to “adopt adequate
measures to safeguard and conserve land, mineral, marine and for-
est and other resources of the LGUs” (Sections 444, 455 and 465).  At
the same time, it calls on the local Sanggunian to “protect the envi-
ronment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger
the environment, such as dynamite fishing, illegal logging and smug-
gling of logs, smuggling of natural resources products and of en-
dangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming, and
such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of
entrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance” (Sec-
tions 447, 458 and 468).
Thus, a closer reading of the Code indicates that local au-
tonomy in ENR management is limited, at best, and ambiguous, at
worst.  This problem comes about because the Code transfers to LGUs
the responsibility over community-based forest and watershed
projects, for instance, even while it allows the DENR to retain su-
pervision and control over such projects.  From this perspective,
LGUs are given service responsibility but not the appropriate au-
thority.
On the other hand, the authorities and powers given to local
chief executives and local Sanggunians appear to be broader than
the basic services and facilities devolved to LGUs and clearly dupli-
cate and overlap with DENR functions.  Consequently, these provi-
sions cause confusion on what precisely are the LGUs’ responsibili-
ties with respect to ENR management.
At the same time, Section 17 (c) provides the basis for the con-
tinued involvement of central government agencies in functions that
are primarily assigned to LGUs by allowing central government
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and other facilities, programs and services funded by the national
government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other spe-
cial laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded
from foreign sources.”  Also, Executive Order (EO) 53 mandates
national government agencies (NGAs) to retain management con-
trol over all foreign-assisted projects and/or nationally funded
projects even if the same involve devolved activities.  On the other
hand, because many of the so-called devolved NGAs are made
accountable for the overall outcome in their respective areas, they
deem it their responsibility to direct LGU behavior in support of
national objective.9   Thus, most of them tend to make full use of
Section 17 ( c) of the Code and EO 53 regarding augmentation.
Hence, the prevailing regulatory framework not only effectively
permits but also encourages the existence of a two-track delivery
system, where both central government agencies and LGUs can
initiate devolved activities (Gonzalez 1996).  In turn, such a situa-
tion results in lack of clarity on the accountability of LGUs vis-à-
vis DENR.
While some quarters may view this situation as but a mani-
festation of what they call the policy of distrust that many central
government agencies have put in place after the implementation of
the Local Government Code for the purpose of protecting their turf,
it may be viewed, perhaps more constructively, as a manifestation
of the difficulties in defining expenditure assignments when the
services/functions being devolved involve the spillover of benefits/
costs to other jurisdictions.  In a sense, it also reflects the inherent
tension between local autonomy and national objectives.
Recall the decentralization theorem (see previous section) and
the “principle of subsidiarity,” 10  the basic principles suggested by
the literature on fiscal federalism (or fiscal decentralization) to guide
9 For instance, DoH is accountable for the overall health status of the country in the same
way that the DENR is accountable for overall ENR management results.
10 The ‘principle of subisidiarity” suggests that spending and regulatory functions should be
exercised by lower levels of government unless a convincing case can be made for assigning
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the assignment of expenditure responsibilities to LGUs.  They im-
ply that if the benefits derived from any given public service is
local in scope (e.g., fire protection, road maintenance) then said
service is appropriately assigned to lower levels of government.
On the other hand, if the benefits derived from the public service
under consideration is national in scope (e.g., national defense,
foreign affairs), then it should be assigned to the central govern-
ment.
However, in the case of services that have spatial externalities
or those that are characterized by economies of scale, the decision
on expenditure assignment will have to hinge on the geographical
reach of the spillout of benefits or costs.  In any case, it may happen
that the most efficient jurisdiction may not coincide with a well-
defined political jurisdiction.  For instance, the watershed or the
coastal ecosystem may cover several LGUs. While assigning func-
tions involving externalities to the higher level of government (e.g.,
province) is an option, it may not be uniformly appropriate.  Be-
cause of this, special or multipurpose jurisdictions like river basin
development authorities are found in other countries.
Hence, a review of the appropriateness of existing expendi-
ture assignment of ENR management functions in the Philippines
in the context of possible interjurisdictional spill over of benefits
and costs appears to be in order considering the low priority many
LGUs, in fact, give to ENR management functions.  However, in
the conduct of such a review, it is important to keep in mind that
the optimal level of environmental quality can differ across locali-
ties because of differences in environmental conditions and local
tastes (Mendoza 1996).  For instance, individuals’ willingness to
pay to avoid damages associated with waste water discharges
depend on preferences and income of the local community, popu-
lation density, and the assimilative capacity of the environment.
Also, delos Angeles and Israel (1993) argues that the role of LGUs
in enforcing rules and building resource conservation constituents
cannot be understated because of the preference for on-site type
of regulations.MANASAN : Devolution of ENR Management       45
Technical Capacity of LGUs in Performing Devolved ENR
Management Functions
The lack of technical capability in the area of ENR manage-
ment at the local level is an oft-repeated complaint.  This problem
stems primarily from three factors.  First, among the devolved agen-
cies, the DENR devolved the least number of personnel—less than 4
percent compared with 50 percent in other agencies.  Unlike in other
areas where the devolved personnel carried with them their exper-
tise when they were transferred to the LGUs, the implementation of
devolved ENR management functions was severely handicapped
given the the small number of warm bodies that were shifted from
the DENR to the LGUs with devolution.  Second, the position of the
ENR management officer is considered an optional position under
the Code. Budget constraints at the local level, intensified by the
magnitude of the funding requirement for devolved personnel in
other areas (especially health services), have caused many LGUs
not to hire an ENR officer much less to deploy adequate staff to
their ENR offices.  Third, because all line functions are appropriated
by the regional and field offices of the DENR while technical func-
tions (and the concomitant specialized knowledge and skill) are
lodged in the staff bureaus at the central office, LGUs have little
access to the technical resources of the department (Gonzalez 1996).
Financing Issues
As with other devolved services, inadequate funding support
hounds the implementation of devolved ENR management func-
tions.  On the one hand, the presence of vertical and horizontal im-
balances means that many LGUs do not have adequate resources to
cover the cost of devolved functions, in general, and devolved ENR
functions, in particular.  On the other hand, because the benefits of
ENR management is oftentimes not confined to the local commu-
nity, LGUs, especially lower level LGUs, tend to underprovide and
consequently, underfund said function.
Vertical balance.  As indicated earlier, the implementation
of the Code resulted in significant increases in the IRA share ofPHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 46
LGUs, with barangays receiving the biggest proportional rate of
increase, followed by cities and municipalities.  Despite this, how-
ever, there is a widespread perception that a vertical imbalance
exists in the sense that the LGUs’ prevailing share in national taxes
is deficient to cover both the cost of devolved functions and the
cost of the so-called unfunded mandates.  These unfunded man-
dates include the salary increases under the Salary Standardiza-
tion Law and the additional personnel benefits under the Magna
Carta for Health Workers.  Analysis shows that while these con-
cerns were unfounded in the aggregate in the early years of Code
implementation (i.e., 1993, 1994, and 1995), this was not the case
in 1996, 1997, and 1998 when the salary adjustments under the
Salary Standardization Law were so hefty that the increases in
the IRA were not able to keep up with the rising cost of devolved
functions and unfunded mandates. However, a comparison of the
aggregate IRA levels with LGU expenditure responsibilities (in-
cluding devolved functions) in 1999 show that the natural increase
in the IRA arising from the implementation of the Code is now
sufficient to cover the inflation and population growth adjustments
in the cost of devolved functions and unfunded mandates
(Manasan 2002).
Horizontal balance.  Provinces absorb 45.6 percent of the
total cost of devolved functions, municipalities 47.4 percent, cities
7.0 percent, and barangays 0 percent.  Contrast this with the man-
dated share of LGUs in the IRA: provinces 23 percent, cities 23
percent, municipalities 34 percent, and barangays 20 percent. It is
therefore clear that there is a mismatch in the resources transferred
and the expenditure responsibilities devolved to the different lev-
els of local government.
In addition to the horizontal imbalance across levels of local
government, an imbalance also exists across LGUs within each level.
Thus, while the increase in the IRA share of some LGUs is not enough
to finance the functions devolved to them, others have received re-
sources beyond their requirements. For instance, in 1993, the per
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for which data were available.11   In 2000, 15 out of 79 provinces, 295
out of 1,525 municipalities, and 3 out of 83 cities suffered negative
net resource transfers.
Clearly, there is a need to improve on the IRA distribution
formula so that the expenditure needs of the various levels of local
government and the different LGUs within each level are adequately
taken into account.  In this regard, it is important to remember that
most estimates of the cost of devolved functions tend to understate
the cost of devolved ENR programs and activities because the trans-
fer of ENR functions was typically not associated with the transfer
of personnel from the DENR to the LGUs.
At the same time, one must not lose sight of the
interconnectedness of natural resources in defining and estimating
the expenditure needs of various types of LGUs.  Thus, one should
be wary of formulae that attempt to shift more resources (in terms
of IRA share) from noncoastal LGUs to coastal LGUs in recognition
of the greater resources needed by the latter for coastal protection.
Note that such an approach would tend to take resources away from
upland LGUs (and consequently, management of the uplands),
which may in turn result in greater lowland and coastal degrada-
tion.  For instance, the protection of the watershed in Kiamba, an
upland LGU, is as essential to the protection of Sarangani Bay as
coastal resource interventions in Glan, a coastal LGU.
 Augmentation funds and pork barrel.  Congressmen are en-
amored by Section 17’s provision with respect to augmentation
funds because it allows them easy access to pork barrel funds by
the simple act of inserting a special provision in the General Ap-
propriations Act, which ordains that monies from the augmenta-
tion funds can only be released for “projects that are identified by
members of Congress.”  Consequently, it has come to pass that the
budgets of devolved central government agencies grew dispropor-
tionately relative to the IRA.  To wit, the IRA grew by 15 percent
11 Per capita net resource transfer in 1993 is defined as per capita 1993 IRA less per capita
1992 IRA less per capita cost of devolved functions adjusted for inflation.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 48
yearly on the average between 1994 and 1997 while DA budget
expanded by 48 percent, that of the DoH by 25 percent, and that
of the DSWD by 22 percent.  Although this trend was reversed in
more recent years, the practice whereby Congressmen identify the
type and location of projects financed from augmentation funds
continue and is a major source of discord between Congress and
LGU officials.  Thus, while the augmentation fund provision of
the Code presents a logical opening for the operation of a match-
ing grants program for devolved activities with significant exter-
nalities and spillover of benefits (as in environmental or basic so-
cial programs), it has been used against the interest of local au-
tonomy in practice.
Fiscal inefficiency. The IRA is by far the largest source of
revenue to most LGUs.  Indeed, it more than covers the cost of
devolved expenditures for many LGUs.  If local revenues come at
a considerable cost to LGUs, then it is possible that they would
rely upon the IRA for revenue and not exert a vigorous local tax
effort including the imposition of user charges for environmental
services and use of natural resources.12   Empirical evidence seems
to support this view.  Regression analysis shows that while inter-
governmental transfers had a neutral effect on local revenue per-
formance in 1985 (prior to the Code), it substituted for local tax
revenues in all levels of local governments in 1992 and 1993
(Manasan 1995).  This result is validated using data for 1995 and
1997 (Manasan 2000).  This finding suggests the need to alter the
IRA distribution formula so as to provide incentives for local tax
effort.
12 Interviews with local government officials invariably indicate that they equate increased
tax effort with lower chances of winning an election.MANASAN : Devolution of ENR Management       49
OPPORTUNITIES IN THE DEVOLUTION OF ENR
MANAGEMENT
Efficiency Gains from Fiscal Decentralization
Efficiency gains from decentralization have three dimensions:
production efficiency, allocative efficiency, and fiscal efficiency
(Guess et al. 1997).  Productive efficiency refers to the cost at which
goods and services are produced.  Production efficiency is improved
if resources are reallocated to get the most output with given re-
sources.  Production efficiency results very often because the costs
associated with the practice of having decisions made in the center
is minimized by the devolution of functions to lower level govern-
ments.  For instance, there is less need for local officials to travel to
the center of government to get some approval/authority signed.
Also, with devolution, LGUs are able to economize by substituting
inputs that are cheaper locally for other types of inputs.  Some of
these gains are shared by deconcentration to lower level adminis-
trative units, but to a limited extent, as lower level governments
tend to more autonomous.
Gains in allocative efficiency results when public spending is
better matched with consumer preferences. One may observe the
changes in the mix of publicly provided goods and services with
the implementation of fiscal decentralization.
Lastly, fiscal efficiency deals with the ways LGUs finance their
operations.  First, LGUs should have the ability to establish some
correspondence between the services that are provided to local con-
stituents to the taxes they pay.  Second, the system of intergovern-
mental transfers should provide adequate finance without overly
distorting local preferences.  Third, the system of finance for LGUs
should not threaten macroeconomic stability.
An earlier analysis of the implementation of the Local Gov-
ernment Code indicates that production and allocative efficiency
have improved with fiscal decentralization although some defi-
ciencies are apparent with respect to the impact of the Code on
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shown that LGUs do things cheaper.  This is certainly true in the
case of the construction of roads, school building, and other local
structures.  At the same time, the mix of local expenditures has
changed since the implementation of the Code, the expenditure
pattern shifting in favor of education, housing, and general public
services.
Greater LGU Accountability through NGO/PO Participation
It is generally accepted that the gains from fiscal decentrali-
zation would tend to come about because it fosters a governance
structure that enhances the responsiveness of local decisionmaking
to the people for whom the services are intended, thereby encour-
aging fiscal responsibility and accountability.  In the Philippines,
this tendency is further strengthened by the space that the Local
Government Code provides to NGOs and POs in local special bod-
ies.  Thus, while devolution does not guarantee that local commu-
nities will reap more benefits and be more interested in sustain-
able ENR management, it does increase the chances that this will
happen.
LGU Share in National Wealth
As pointed out earlier, the Code provides that LGUs receive a
40 percent share in the gross collection derived by national govern-
ment from natural resources taxes, fees and charges and from its
share in any co-production, joint venture or production-sharing
agreement in the utilization and development of national wealth in
their jurisdiction.  At present, the proceeds from the LGU share in
national wealth are used to finance local development and liveli-
hood projects.  Prospectively, with appropriate changes in the en-
abling law, these funds might be used exclusively for ENR conser-
vation and management.  However, at present, many LGUs experi-
enced delays in the release of their share from national wealth even
as they experience difficulty in verifying the amounts they are sup-
posed to receive.  Also, existing rules and regulations are such that
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(e.g., geothermal plant) are entitled to the share in national wealth.
This is true of the 1 centavo/kWH the National Power Corpora-
tion (NPC) gives to municipalities hosting power-generating fa-
cilities.  There is thus no scope for the NPC to make payments to
distant jurisdictions in upper watershed areas, even though their
actions may be important to the long-term health of a hydroelec-
tric facility.  A similar controversy hounds the division of the LGU
share in national wealth from the Malampaya natural gas projects.
While it is clear that the municipality that hosts the wells will be
benefited, it was not quite as clear whether all municipalities that
will be traversed by the pipes that will carry the natural gas from
the well to the processing plant will likewise be given their share.
Wider Scope for LGUs to Impose User Charges and Fees
Abstracting from the disincentive effect of the IRA on the lo-
cal revenue mobilization, the Code broadened the powers of LGUs
to levy user charges and fees.  In particular, the Code does not im-
pose ceilings on the rates that LGUs may impose.  This provision of
the Code not only provides LGUs the handle in using market-based
instruments in ENR management by LGUs but also allows them to
establish some correspondence between the services they provide
their constituents and the taxes/charges they pay, thus, inducing
greater accountability.  In fact, many LGUs have made use of this
provision in the recent past.  For instance, many LGUs around
Lingayen Gulf have increased their fishery rentals/charges in an
attempt to protect the environmental quality of the Gulf.
Addressing Externalities and Overlapping Jurisdictions
Given the poor correspondence between political jurisdictions
and the optimal size jurisdiction from the point of view of ENR
management, structures and mechanisms that will address spatial
externalities and the associated underfunding of ENR functions by
LGUs have to be supported and strengthened. These include the
institutionalization of inter-LGU cooperation and the development
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An increasing trend toward the formalization of inter-LGU
collaboration in the delivery of area-wide services is evident in the
formation of many metropolitan arrangements (e.g., Metro Cebu,
Metro Naga, Metro Baguio) in the last decade.  However, examples
of such arrangements in the ENR area are limited.   But where they
exist, they have helped clarify the LGUs’ role relative not only to
national government agencies but also relative to other LGUs.  For
instance, the Lingayen Gulf Coastal Area Management Council
(LGCAMC) has provided the venue for sorting out the differences
not only between the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
(BFAR) and the municipalities around the gulf but also among the
said LGUs themselves.  Thus, the municipal coastal development
plans of the various LGUs concerned were harmonized into the
Lingayen Gulf Management Plan through an extensive and inten-
sive consultation process.  Prospectively, the importance of inter-
LGU cooperation in drawing up bay-wide or gulf-wide coastal man-
agement systems cannot be underestimated.  This can also be said
of integrated policies that address watershed  management and/or
upland development.
Alternatively, a matching grants program for ENR manage-
ment may be designed to help ensure that LGUs do not underprovide
services that have significant spillover effects.  Under such a pro-
gram, the central government will provide LGUs with grants they
will match and can use for a specific purpose only.13   This way, the
program can provide an avenue for the central government to in-
fluence LGU spending without necessarily compromising local au-
tonomy.  Matching grants programs have been used with varying
degrees of success in the education and health sectors in the last
decade but have been conspicuously absent in the ENR sector.
13 In principle, the size of the grant should be consistent with the extent of the spillover of
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